I just came across this flow chart "How to succeed as an Ayn Rand Character" (ht: Brian Doherty). I've just been reading through Atlas Shrugged, and I can say that this chart is spot on. The last time I'd read Ayn Rand was when Anthem was assigned as reading in my English class in High School, back in 1997. People had recommended to me that I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged during those years, and I've managed to put it off until now. I always thought the books were unbearably too long, and it also didn't help that other people I knew really bad-mouthed Ayn Rand. But now that Atlas Shrugged has been getting so much attention lately and has had a large recent upsurge in popularity, I thought it important.
I'm not exacxtly bowled over by it. Atlas Shrugged is definitely unbearably too long, and Rand has no skill for succinctness. I can't share other libertarians' fondness for her, though I share the same type of resentment towards the man counter-productive programs initiated by the government in the name of the common good. On the other hand, I don't share the profound disgust that my philosophical colleagues have towards her. I think the main reason they don't like her is because she isn't very philosophically sophisticated. Her ideas aren't as philosophically rich as the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, or even lesser luminaries, which makes her far less interesting and worth the time of study/
But also Atlas Shrugged has left me with the impression that I just don't like philosophical novels in general. I figure that if you want to write about or defend an idea you should just write about it, and not try to dress it up in some contrive plot. There have been many idea-books out there that have sold extremely well (like books by Malcolm Gladwell, Thomas L. Friedman, Steve Levitt), so you can't argue that you need to dress it up to sell it to the people. Admittedly, such books aren't as sophisticated as great philosophical classics, and thus probably aren't the road to timeless philosophical glory, but they are quite influential.
I remember I was reading recently (I wish I could remember where) someone saying that all literature (as well as all movies and plays) is manipulative. The author is always trying to get us to feel certain things, or think certain things about the characters or events. But as a reader (or viewer) what we don't like is obvious manipulation. We don't like to feel we're being manipulated. It causes us to rebel. We like the artistry of subtle manipulation. One thing one would be reluctant to accuse Ayn Rand of is subtlety. Her clearly most admirable characters are all pure prophets of her philosophy, and they defend it in long monologues. If you read her non-fiction, she'll frequently quote her characters' speeches as if they express her philosophy better than she could.
I think one of the problems with philosophical novels, in general is that they have to be so obvious. If they're too subtle, then people will miss the point they're trying to make. SO I say, better to lay out your positions in clear non-fiction prose, and confine yourself to some brief illuminating examples rather than stretching it out over a full-length novel.
Sunday, July 19, 2009
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Price Competition in Higher Education and Health Care
In a market of voluntary exchange, when sellers of goods and services compete, they compete in two primary ways: price and quality. For example, when I buy a computer, it matters to me firstly, the speed of the processor, the amount of Ram, the size of the hard drive, expandability, operating system, and so on (quality) and secondly, the price. And these both matter when I buy a pair of shoes, or a flight to Minneapolis, or a vacuum cleaner, or a 45-minute massage.
If both price and quality competition are strong, the products will generally both decline in price and increase in quality. But of course the relative importance of either price or quality can be be weaker, if consumers don't emphasize one or the other in their buying.
If quality is not very important, then prices will be driven down even more strongly. This is the type of trend seldom see, but sometimes it happens in some raw material.
Vice versa, price can be of weak importance. For example, with Veblen goods, that is, status goods: things like designer clothes, expensive cars, fine jewelry, huge vacation homes, and so on. Quality matters a lot, but price is less important, since the customers buying these products are much less price sensitive. Thus, relatively marginal improvements in quality count for huge increases in price. Thus, price increases are kept unusually high.
But even more relevant these days than Veblen goods are two other important areas or weak price competition, where price growth is strong. In particular, health care and higher education.
In both of these we observe strong price growth because of factors that weaken price competition. In health care, health costs are primarily paid by insurers, Medicare and Medicaid. Only a very small percentage of health care is paid out of pocket, and prices are not conspicuously advertised. And even then health insurance itself is insulated from price competition by being provided by employers. Paying health insurance out of pocket tends to reduce costs. Thus, in contrast to areas of health care where costs are usually paid out of pocket, such as cosmetic surgery and laser eye surgery, areas of non-elective care that are not paid out of pocket see strong long term price growth in excess of inflation.
Higher education similarly is being paid for by loans or by scholarships or by parents' college funds. Very little again is being paid directly out of pocket by students.
When a buyer is putting down someone else's money for a purchase, price sensitivity decreases, especially if it is someone impersonal, that we don't have any emotional attachment to ("Nobody spends somebody else's money as wisely as he spends his own"). Certainly, we clearly don't have any emotional attachment to our insurer, to the federal government or the a scholarship organization. We, quite frankly, don't really have a lot of emotional attachment to our future self (who we haven't met yet) who will be paying for the loans, as well.
In health care and higher education there is constant demand for ever better quality. This quality costs money, which drives up costs and without a check from consumer demand, this will increase rapidly. Now, we should recognize that there are many factors that may drive up prices in health care and education. In medical care, there is also dramatic growth in regulation (which grows ever more expensive). With higher education there is also the influence of college ratings and how they are calcuated, as well as that most colleges are not for profit (another short post on the same article). And in both cases there is the simple fact that we can afford to pay more because of greatest prosperity. These other factors are undoubtedly relevant. It's just that all industries have upward price pressure, bot in those cases price competition via consumer demand keeps prices in check and may even push prices downward despite all these factors. Weak price competition thus might be better described as permitting price growth by opening the spigot wide open to other factors.
Of the two, the rise in the cost of higher education is actual the more disturbing trend, since, whereas it is clear the health care has dramatically improved as costs have increased, it is not clear that education has gotten any better while costs have risen.
This is relevant for us now since policies are being pursued that will further weaken price competition. Much talk has been made of expanding higher education through increased lending. Considerations are also being considered of expanding health care by making the government an insurance provider (More health insurance not the answer). The idea behind the latter in particular is that government can control prices simply by fiat, namely through price controls. Of course, this will invite all the problems of shortage that price controls always entails.
Obviously, the way to control health care costs is to expand the amount of care covered out of pocket, with more individuals opting for high deductibles, that merely serves to cover emergencies and not basic health care, and to have more health insurance paid by the insuree, instead of their employer. And similarly, we should be contract student loans or increasing the amount that students have to pay out of pocket if we want to control costs.
The current policies unfortunately will have consequences completely in contradiction to the intentions of their advocates.
If both price and quality competition are strong, the products will generally both decline in price and increase in quality. But of course the relative importance of either price or quality can be be weaker, if consumers don't emphasize one or the other in their buying.
If quality is not very important, then prices will be driven down even more strongly. This is the type of trend seldom see, but sometimes it happens in some raw material.
Vice versa, price can be of weak importance. For example, with Veblen goods, that is, status goods: things like designer clothes, expensive cars, fine jewelry, huge vacation homes, and so on. Quality matters a lot, but price is less important, since the customers buying these products are much less price sensitive. Thus, relatively marginal improvements in quality count for huge increases in price. Thus, price increases are kept unusually high.
But even more relevant these days than Veblen goods are two other important areas or weak price competition, where price growth is strong. In particular, health care and higher education.
In both of these we observe strong price growth because of factors that weaken price competition. In health care, health costs are primarily paid by insurers, Medicare and Medicaid. Only a very small percentage of health care is paid out of pocket, and prices are not conspicuously advertised. And even then health insurance itself is insulated from price competition by being provided by employers. Paying health insurance out of pocket tends to reduce costs. Thus, in contrast to areas of health care where costs are usually paid out of pocket, such as cosmetic surgery and laser eye surgery, areas of non-elective care that are not paid out of pocket see strong long term price growth in excess of inflation.
Higher education similarly is being paid for by loans or by scholarships or by parents' college funds. Very little again is being paid directly out of pocket by students.
When a buyer is putting down someone else's money for a purchase, price sensitivity decreases, especially if it is someone impersonal, that we don't have any emotional attachment to ("Nobody spends somebody else's money as wisely as he spends his own"). Certainly, we clearly don't have any emotional attachment to our insurer, to the federal government or the a scholarship organization. We, quite frankly, don't really have a lot of emotional attachment to our future self (who we haven't met yet) who will be paying for the loans, as well.
In health care and higher education there is constant demand for ever better quality. This quality costs money, which drives up costs and without a check from consumer demand, this will increase rapidly. Now, we should recognize that there are many factors that may drive up prices in health care and education. In medical care, there is also dramatic growth in regulation (which grows ever more expensive). With higher education there is also the influence of college ratings and how they are calcuated, as well as that most colleges are not for profit (another short post on the same article). And in both cases there is the simple fact that we can afford to pay more because of greatest prosperity. These other factors are undoubtedly relevant. It's just that all industries have upward price pressure, bot in those cases price competition via consumer demand keeps prices in check and may even push prices downward despite all these factors. Weak price competition thus might be better described as permitting price growth by opening the spigot wide open to other factors.
Of the two, the rise in the cost of higher education is actual the more disturbing trend, since, whereas it is clear the health care has dramatically improved as costs have increased, it is not clear that education has gotten any better while costs have risen.
This is relevant for us now since policies are being pursued that will further weaken price competition. Much talk has been made of expanding higher education through increased lending. Considerations are also being considered of expanding health care by making the government an insurance provider (More health insurance not the answer). The idea behind the latter in particular is that government can control prices simply by fiat, namely through price controls. Of course, this will invite all the problems of shortage that price controls always entails.
Obviously, the way to control health care costs is to expand the amount of care covered out of pocket, with more individuals opting for high deductibles, that merely serves to cover emergencies and not basic health care, and to have more health insurance paid by the insuree, instead of their employer. And similarly, we should be contract student loans or increasing the amount that students have to pay out of pocket if we want to control costs.
The current policies unfortunately will have consequences completely in contradiction to the intentions of their advocates.
Monday, July 13, 2009
Consciousness & Sci-Fi Transportation Technology
I like to use science fiction as a good way to try to reimagine thorny philosophical questions. A good place to me to look at questions of whether there is a non-material part of us—like a soul, a mind, a consciousness—is in the possibility of science fiction teleportation devices.
If we assume that all we are is a body, then something like the transporter from Star Trek is unproblematic. Let's assume that we have a soul that's some sort of free floating thing separated from the body that is liberated after death. In the Star Trek transporter, your body is transformed into pure energy, zapped down to the planet's surface and is reconstituted as an identical material form. Does your soul float along through space and jump into the reconstituted body? Does the reconstituted body even have a soul? Does it acquire a new soul?
We might think it possible that since the same matter is used all the way through—being translated in energy, zapped down, then reconstituted—that the soul might be towed along.
Let's try an even harder case. Let's imagine that transportation works something like in The Fly: the original matter is destroyed, the information to reconstitute the matter is transmitted through electrical signals, and then a separate machine creates an identical copy. Is the copy going to somehow acquire the same soul?
I think the movie that best raises this point is the film very of The Prestige. In The Prestige, there is a machine that both transports and replicates the subject. When the subject steps into the machine, a second version of him is created in a different place. So, what happens to his soul? Is it duplicated, bifurcated, split? Let's look at it from his perspective. He steps into the machine, looking out at the audience; the machine warms up and there is a flash. Now, what does he see after the flash? Is he 1) still looking at the audience as the trap door opens below his feet? Is he 2) looking out over the audience from the balcony? Is he 3) seeing both simultaneously? Or is he 4) seeing nothing because his soul has blinked out of existence? I think the movie suggests it is 1), which is why the ending is so poignant. This also seems like the more plausible scenario given the situation.
To return to Star Trek, we might imagine what it would be like from someone using a transporter. I step into the transporter, looking out the room as someone prepares to transport me down to the planet's surface. Is it a) just a blink and now I'm looking out over some strange alien planet? Or is it b) the room disappears and then there is nothing, since I've blinked out of existence; meanwhile, simultaneously, a new man has been generated on the planet's surface, a new man physically identical to me, who bears all my memories, all my self-identity and who is in every sense convinced he is me. This new man remembers being up on the spaceship and everything that happened to me before and is convinced that he has done and experienced everything I have, even though he was just newly created only two seconds ago. This presents a problem since you can't decide whether it was scenario a or b that happened just by asking him.
If we think of the transfer in any of the cases when we are merely recreating the matter, and not reusing the same matter, then it is difficult to imagine the soul being conserved. It seems like the only reason to destroy the original is to preserve the illusion that the person hasn't simply been copied and that the copy is an entirely different person. Destroying the original before the copy is made allows us to think that it is merely the same person. But just like in the case of The Prestige, where there is a lag between the creation of the copy and the destruction of the original, the consciousness doesn't seem like it would find its way to the copy.
This is all to say, that if we develop technology like the above, then it will present real tests to help us better understand the nature of consciousness. And, in addition, it's possible because your consciousness or mind or soul cannot be transported with your body, these technologies will be things that most of us would prefer not to try.
If we assume that all we are is a body, then something like the transporter from Star Trek is unproblematic. Let's assume that we have a soul that's some sort of free floating thing separated from the body that is liberated after death. In the Star Trek transporter, your body is transformed into pure energy, zapped down to the planet's surface and is reconstituted as an identical material form. Does your soul float along through space and jump into the reconstituted body? Does the reconstituted body even have a soul? Does it acquire a new soul?
We might think it possible that since the same matter is used all the way through—being translated in energy, zapped down, then reconstituted—that the soul might be towed along.
Let's try an even harder case. Let's imagine that transportation works something like in The Fly: the original matter is destroyed, the information to reconstitute the matter is transmitted through electrical signals, and then a separate machine creates an identical copy. Is the copy going to somehow acquire the same soul?
I think the movie that best raises this point is the film very of The Prestige. In The Prestige, there is a machine that both transports and replicates the subject. When the subject steps into the machine, a second version of him is created in a different place. So, what happens to his soul? Is it duplicated, bifurcated, split? Let's look at it from his perspective. He steps into the machine, looking out at the audience; the machine warms up and there is a flash. Now, what does he see after the flash? Is he 1) still looking at the audience as the trap door opens below his feet? Is he 2) looking out over the audience from the balcony? Is he 3) seeing both simultaneously? Or is he 4) seeing nothing because his soul has blinked out of existence? I think the movie suggests it is 1), which is why the ending is so poignant. This also seems like the more plausible scenario given the situation.
To return to Star Trek, we might imagine what it would be like from someone using a transporter. I step into the transporter, looking out the room as someone prepares to transport me down to the planet's surface. Is it a) just a blink and now I'm looking out over some strange alien planet? Or is it b) the room disappears and then there is nothing, since I've blinked out of existence; meanwhile, simultaneously, a new man has been generated on the planet's surface, a new man physically identical to me, who bears all my memories, all my self-identity and who is in every sense convinced he is me. This new man remembers being up on the spaceship and everything that happened to me before and is convinced that he has done and experienced everything I have, even though he was just newly created only two seconds ago. This presents a problem since you can't decide whether it was scenario a or b that happened just by asking him.
If we think of the transfer in any of the cases when we are merely recreating the matter, and not reusing the same matter, then it is difficult to imagine the soul being conserved. It seems like the only reason to destroy the original is to preserve the illusion that the person hasn't simply been copied and that the copy is an entirely different person. Destroying the original before the copy is made allows us to think that it is merely the same person. But just like in the case of The Prestige, where there is a lag between the creation of the copy and the destruction of the original, the consciousness doesn't seem like it would find its way to the copy.
This is all to say, that if we develop technology like the above, then it will present real tests to help us better understand the nature of consciousness. And, in addition, it's possible because your consciousness or mind or soul cannot be transported with your body, these technologies will be things that most of us would prefer not to try.
Monday, March 16, 2009
School Vouchers
There is a very poorly written op-ed by Walt Gardner in the Christian Science Monitor about Vouchers, called School Vouchers Leave too Many Behind. The argument seems to commit the Nirvana Fallacy, aka the Perfect Solution Fallacy, since Gardner seems to be simply arguing that because school vouchers are imperfect, they should be abandoned. This argument only makes sense if we assume there is some perfect alternative, which of course there isn't, and Russel Roberts succinctly criticizes Gardner for it. Nonetheless, I think there are some implicit arguments behind this op-ed that deserve consideration, even though this poorly written op-ed fails to argue them.
For one, Gardner seems to be saying at the end of his op-ed that the students left behind by vouchers are actually worse off with vouchers than without, writing,
Gardner is also implicitly arguing that the kids who take advantage of the vouchers are not better off, evidenced by lack of improvement in test scores. This is also a weak argument, since test scores are a weak indicator of good education. Long term success is a better indicator. This is a doggedly difficult thing to measure since its ultimately impossible to tell how successful they would have been without the vouchers. Thus, that parents of voucher kids are happier with the program is probably the best indicator available, and it shows that the vouchers are good.
Thus, if Gardner is making an argument that doesn't fall into the Nirvana fallacy, it seems to be that vouchers don't help those who do take advantage of them and do hurt those who don't take advantage of them. I think both of these arguments are weak and are poorly supported.
Of course, Gardners primary argument is that people are wrong who claim politicians are being hypocritical by sending their kids to good private schools, and then trying to deny the vouchers that are the means of the less privileged going to good private schools. But this argument depends on showing that vouchers actually hurt the poor, which he fails to do.
In the end, I think vouchers are a good idea, mostly just on the grounds that they save oodles of money. I think an even better solution would be to eliminate public schools and vouchers. Behind vouchers are the threat of creating arbitrary and ineffective standards for schools to be eligible to receive vouchers. Without vouchers and public schools, education could serve students instead of governments. Poor youngsters would be better served since most likely this situation would create the existence of free charitable schools for the poor, which could serve those who couldn't afford even the most inexpensive private schools. And I think most likely such schools would be guided by a mission to actually recruit underprivileged and neglected children and try to bring them to their school. The problem is that when the government swoops in and takes responsibility for something, like educating the young, it lifts the burden of people to take personal responsibility for themselves and their community. You remove government and people will be trying to assure that the kids in their community are educated.
Update: Mike Smith, senior advisor to the Secretary of Education made a statement about whenever a decision is made about education curricula or standards, at the federal level, it will be inevitably guided by politics. The Cato Institute responds that whenever a decision is made at any level of government (federal, state, local) on education standards and curricula, it will inevitably be guided by politics. And they link to a paper Neal McCluskey published for Cato two years ago called Why We Fight: How Public Schools Cause Social Conflict, that argues the only way to avoid conflict about curricula and standards is to let parents choose their schools.
For one, Gardner seems to be saying at the end of his op-ed that the students left behind by vouchers are actually worse off with vouchers than without, writing,
Without anyone in their corner, children who remain in regular high schools have a graduation rate well below that in voucher high schools
...
voucher supporters believe these children constitute the unavoidable price that must be paid in the service of the principle of choiceHe cites their poor graduation rates, but this evidence doesn't prove that point, since these students would probably do poorly with or without vouchers. I would imagine that these students would be better off with vouchers, since they would be attending smaller public schools, which could thereby serve their smaller student pool better. Also, since vouchers are considerably cheaper (saving 10-15 thousand, and even higher in DCs school district, PER student) then that frees up more money for these students, though, of course, more money per se, is not the route to better education ( though it can potentially open up more possibility for better education).
Gardner is also implicitly arguing that the kids who take advantage of the vouchers are not better off, evidenced by lack of improvement in test scores. This is also a weak argument, since test scores are a weak indicator of good education. Long term success is a better indicator. This is a doggedly difficult thing to measure since its ultimately impossible to tell how successful they would have been without the vouchers. Thus, that parents of voucher kids are happier with the program is probably the best indicator available, and it shows that the vouchers are good.
Thus, if Gardner is making an argument that doesn't fall into the Nirvana fallacy, it seems to be that vouchers don't help those who do take advantage of them and do hurt those who don't take advantage of them. I think both of these arguments are weak and are poorly supported.
Of course, Gardners primary argument is that people are wrong who claim politicians are being hypocritical by sending their kids to good private schools, and then trying to deny the vouchers that are the means of the less privileged going to good private schools. But this argument depends on showing that vouchers actually hurt the poor, which he fails to do.
In the end, I think vouchers are a good idea, mostly just on the grounds that they save oodles of money. I think an even better solution would be to eliminate public schools and vouchers. Behind vouchers are the threat of creating arbitrary and ineffective standards for schools to be eligible to receive vouchers. Without vouchers and public schools, education could serve students instead of governments. Poor youngsters would be better served since most likely this situation would create the existence of free charitable schools for the poor, which could serve those who couldn't afford even the most inexpensive private schools. And I think most likely such schools would be guided by a mission to actually recruit underprivileged and neglected children and try to bring them to their school. The problem is that when the government swoops in and takes responsibility for something, like educating the young, it lifts the burden of people to take personal responsibility for themselves and their community. You remove government and people will be trying to assure that the kids in their community are educated.
Update: Mike Smith, senior advisor to the Secretary of Education made a statement about whenever a decision is made about education curricula or standards, at the federal level, it will be inevitably guided by politics. The Cato Institute responds that whenever a decision is made at any level of government (federal, state, local) on education standards and curricula, it will inevitably be guided by politics. And they link to a paper Neal McCluskey published for Cato two years ago called Why We Fight: How Public Schools Cause Social Conflict, that argues the only way to avoid conflict about curricula and standards is to let parents choose their schools.
Monday, March 2, 2009
Eubulides' Paradoxes
I love paradoxes, and have tried to collect a considerable number of them, in philosophy as well as in other intellectual disciplines. I define paradox rather broadly as any real or apparent contradiction or just something that seems to defy common sense. In many cases the paradoxes are in a sense superficial since the apparent contradiction can be resolved.
In the ancient world most of the interesting paradoxes are either from from Zeno of Elea or Eubulides of Miletus. I'll talk about Zeno later, but I want to talk about Eubulides right now.
He has seven paradoxes attributed to him, but many of them are redundant. Ultimately he really has four unique paradoxes: the Masked Man paradox, the Horn Paradox, the Liar paradox and the Sorites paradox
The Masked Man paradox basically goes: if there is a masked man who is your father then someone might ask you, "Do you know your father?" To which you say "yes." Then they ask: "Do you know that masked man over there?" To which you answer, "No." But since the masked man is your father, you seem to be saying that you both know and don't know your father. This is only an apparent contradiction resolved by either seeing it as an equivocation on the word "know" The first "know" means "is acquainted with," and the second "know" means "can identify." Or the apparent contradiction is resolved by recognizing that the second answer, "No, I don't know that masked man," was simply made in error. Namely, you could say, "I didn't realize that I knew the masked man, because I didn't realize he was my father."
Next there is the horn paradox, which basically goes: If we assume that you have whatever you haven't lost, then from the observation that you've never lost horns, you therefore must have horns, but of course you don't have horns. This is also an only apparent paradox. It is just the result of a bad initial premise. No, we can't say that you have whatever you haven't lost. We can say, you have whatever how previously had and haven't lost."
The next paradox is the liar paradox, which has a few variations. For example, if I were to say, "Everything I say is a lie," or "This statement is false." Both variations are probably best explained as arising from some of the artificialities of language. It does appear to present some problems for logic, so a number of attempts have been made to resolve it. I think I'll return to it in more detail later.
Finally, there is the Sorites paradox ("sorites" means "heap"), another difficult paradox and I think Eubulides' most interesting paradox. The idea here is that if I have a heap of grains of sand, and I take away one grain of sand then it is still a heap. And if I take away another grain, it is still heap. And if I extend this logic, then at some point it will be too small to be a heap. But I can't make a heap into a non-heap by simply taking away one grain of sand. So, how did it become too small to be a heap?
Mostly this paradox is built on the vagueness of language, since "heap" and "non-heap" are not concretely defined terms. But when used in logical argument they are treated as a precise bivalent, black and white distinction.
Another way to think of it: If a million grains of a sand is a heap then certainly 999,999 is a heap, so is 999,998 and 999,997, etc. From this we infer that if x number of grains is a heap, then x-1 grains is a heap. If we iterate this reasoning again and again, we eventually can conclude that 1 grain of sand is a heap, as is 0 grains of sand. I would classify this as a vertical argument: an argument where each new premise is dependent on a previous conclusion. Vertical arguments grow weaker as one increases the steps since one increases the likelihood that there is a weak or fallible argument somewhere along the chain. Vertical arguments depend on an unbroken chain of infallible arguments to work (doable in math, but less so in philosophy). To conclude that 1 grain of sand is a heap requires a vertical argument of many thousands of steps, Any fallibility in the assumption that "if x number of grains is a heap, then x-1 grains is a heap" is amplified by the number of steps. The argument becomes rephrased "if x number of grains is a heap, then x-1 grains is a heap, and if x-1 grains is a heap then x-2 grains is a heap, and x-3 grains is a heap, and x-4 grains is a heap ... and x-999,999 grains of sand is a heap." We get an argument that grows weaker each step, just as correlatively the heap of grains of sand grows less likely to be called a "heap" the more grains of sand are removed, until we are left with a remaining bunch of grains that no one would call a heap and a vertical argument that has been stacked so high that it topples over.
In the ancient world most of the interesting paradoxes are either from from Zeno of Elea or Eubulides of Miletus. I'll talk about Zeno later, but I want to talk about Eubulides right now.
He has seven paradoxes attributed to him, but many of them are redundant. Ultimately he really has four unique paradoxes: the Masked Man paradox, the Horn Paradox, the Liar paradox and the Sorites paradox
The Masked Man paradox basically goes: if there is a masked man who is your father then someone might ask you, "Do you know your father?" To which you say "yes." Then they ask: "Do you know that masked man over there?" To which you answer, "No." But since the masked man is your father, you seem to be saying that you both know and don't know your father. This is only an apparent contradiction resolved by either seeing it as an equivocation on the word "know" The first "know" means "is acquainted with," and the second "know" means "can identify." Or the apparent contradiction is resolved by recognizing that the second answer, "No, I don't know that masked man," was simply made in error. Namely, you could say, "I didn't realize that I knew the masked man, because I didn't realize he was my father."
Next there is the horn paradox, which basically goes: If we assume that you have whatever you haven't lost, then from the observation that you've never lost horns, you therefore must have horns, but of course you don't have horns. This is also an only apparent paradox. It is just the result of a bad initial premise. No, we can't say that you have whatever you haven't lost. We can say, you have whatever how previously had and haven't lost."
The next paradox is the liar paradox, which has a few variations. For example, if I were to say, "Everything I say is a lie," or "This statement is false." Both variations are probably best explained as arising from some of the artificialities of language. It does appear to present some problems for logic, so a number of attempts have been made to resolve it. I think I'll return to it in more detail later.
Finally, there is the Sorites paradox ("sorites" means "heap"), another difficult paradox and I think Eubulides' most interesting paradox. The idea here is that if I have a heap of grains of sand, and I take away one grain of sand then it is still a heap. And if I take away another grain, it is still heap. And if I extend this logic, then at some point it will be too small to be a heap. But I can't make a heap into a non-heap by simply taking away one grain of sand. So, how did it become too small to be a heap?
Mostly this paradox is built on the vagueness of language, since "heap" and "non-heap" are not concretely defined terms. But when used in logical argument they are treated as a precise bivalent, black and white distinction.
Another way to think of it: If a million grains of a sand is a heap then certainly 999,999 is a heap, so is 999,998 and 999,997, etc. From this we infer that if x number of grains is a heap, then x-1 grains is a heap. If we iterate this reasoning again and again, we eventually can conclude that 1 grain of sand is a heap, as is 0 grains of sand. I would classify this as a vertical argument: an argument where each new premise is dependent on a previous conclusion. Vertical arguments grow weaker as one increases the steps since one increases the likelihood that there is a weak or fallible argument somewhere along the chain. Vertical arguments depend on an unbroken chain of infallible arguments to work (doable in math, but less so in philosophy). To conclude that 1 grain of sand is a heap requires a vertical argument of many thousands of steps, Any fallibility in the assumption that "if x number of grains is a heap, then x-1 grains is a heap" is amplified by the number of steps. The argument becomes rephrased "if x number of grains is a heap, then x-1 grains is a heap, and if x-1 grains is a heap then x-2 grains is a heap, and x-3 grains is a heap, and x-4 grains is a heap ... and x-999,999 grains of sand is a heap." We get an argument that grows weaker each step, just as correlatively the heap of grains of sand grows less likely to be called a "heap" the more grains of sand are removed, until we are left with a remaining bunch of grains that no one would call a heap and a vertical argument that has been stacked so high that it topples over.
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Grade Inflation
George Leef has an interesting recent article about grade inflation titled, "A is for Average, B is for Being There." He presents some sensible explanations for the cause of grade inflation. The first is the desire of administrators to prop up reputation and revenue by preventing dropouts. When students get Fs or even Ds, they are apt to leave college, which both translates into loss tuition, but also a reduction in their rating due to high dropout rate. This leads to policies, such as making it difficult for professors to fail students. My school, for one, requires us to fill out paperwork justifying any F.
Of course, this paperwork could just be a preemptive defense against the second problem: students complaining about grades. If a student files a complaint about a grade it can create a lot of trouble for a professor. So, a sensible professor, in order to avoid the trouble, eventually learns to give better grades just to be safe. Also, the obvious upward bias of the complaints (students will only complain to have their grades raised; students will never complain if they think their grade is unfairly high) may also contribute to grade inflation.
Secondly, students who receive higher grades rank their teachers higher. Many schools put great stock in these student evaluations, and may use them to determine pay raises and tenure. A sensible professor will give higher grades to students in order to get better ratings and help their career.
After noting these causes, though, Leef recommends simply that professors take moral courage to give their students more accurate grades, as if the causes of the problem, which he mentioned, were merely incidental. Leef quotes Lee Gutkind
More sensibly, the problem should be attacked at its root. The main issues are really that students can cause trouble by complaining about grades, schools can lose enrollees, and professors need good student evaluations for career advancement. Schools should put the burden of proof much more on the student to prove unfair grading practices. To address enrollment, perhaps schools should encourage teachers to withdraw rather than fail substandard students (some schools already encourage this). And the schools should also improve teacher evaluations.
Evaluations definitely serve a valuable formative role, helping teachers get feedback and improve their teaching. But in their role of ranking teachers (their summative function) they're a bit more problematic. In addition to contributing to grade inflation, they also don't seem to correlate with actual content learned, and seemed to be based on more affective impressions. It's also been suggested student evaluations restrict academic freedom, by discouraging professors from defending controversial opinions. Professors can be evaluated poorly simply because the students don't like some controversial opinion the professor expresses.
Students evalutations tend to strongly correlate with evaluations by other teachers and by administrators, which suggests that they are valid measures of teacher performance. But this also suggests that evaluations for the purpose of advancement can be just as well done by these other teachers and administrators, and without the risk of grade inflation.
Schools might also take a direct assault on grade inflation by simply setting mandatory class averages for professors. A school could say that each professor has to reward grades of an average of 80% or 75% (or B- or C+ or C) for all students they teach per semester or per academic year. They wouldn't have to give identical averages for every class, but on average for all classes over an academic year is reasonable. Professors probably wouldn't like this, but it would very simply solve the problem.
I think grade inflation is a serious issue since it diminishes the value of the degree. Instead of an academic degree indicating hard work and an ability to learn, it simply indicates an ability to pay the tuition costs and show up to class. And so schools should address it in order to retain their reputation.
Of course, this paperwork could just be a preemptive defense against the second problem: students complaining about grades. If a student files a complaint about a grade it can create a lot of trouble for a professor. So, a sensible professor, in order to avoid the trouble, eventually learns to give better grades just to be safe. Also, the obvious upward bias of the complaints (students will only complain to have their grades raised; students will never complain if they think their grade is unfairly high) may also contribute to grade inflation.
Secondly, students who receive higher grades rank their teachers higher. Many schools put great stock in these student evaluations, and may use them to determine pay raises and tenure. A sensible professor will give higher grades to students in order to get better ratings and help their career.
After noting these causes, though, Leef recommends simply that professors take moral courage to give their students more accurate grades, as if the causes of the problem, which he mentioned, were merely incidental. Leef quotes Lee Gutkind
Educators must lead the way to take responsibility for the morals and ethics of students by taking a deep look inside themselves and their own actions, drawing their moral and ethical boundaries and honoring the mission with which they have been entrusted. It begins with honesty in grading—rewarding excellence and valuing achievement.Of course, wagging your finger at professors and ask them to risk their careers just to combat such a problem is unlikely to produce results.
More sensibly, the problem should be attacked at its root. The main issues are really that students can cause trouble by complaining about grades, schools can lose enrollees, and professors need good student evaluations for career advancement. Schools should put the burden of proof much more on the student to prove unfair grading practices. To address enrollment, perhaps schools should encourage teachers to withdraw rather than fail substandard students (some schools already encourage this). And the schools should also improve teacher evaluations.
Evaluations definitely serve a valuable formative role, helping teachers get feedback and improve their teaching. But in their role of ranking teachers (their summative function) they're a bit more problematic. In addition to contributing to grade inflation, they also don't seem to correlate with actual content learned, and seemed to be based on more affective impressions. It's also been suggested student evaluations restrict academic freedom, by discouraging professors from defending controversial opinions. Professors can be evaluated poorly simply because the students don't like some controversial opinion the professor expresses.
Students evalutations tend to strongly correlate with evaluations by other teachers and by administrators, which suggests that they are valid measures of teacher performance. But this also suggests that evaluations for the purpose of advancement can be just as well done by these other teachers and administrators, and without the risk of grade inflation.
Schools might also take a direct assault on grade inflation by simply setting mandatory class averages for professors. A school could say that each professor has to reward grades of an average of 80% or 75% (or B- or C+ or C) for all students they teach per semester or per academic year. They wouldn't have to give identical averages for every class, but on average for all classes over an academic year is reasonable. Professors probably wouldn't like this, but it would very simply solve the problem.
I think grade inflation is a serious issue since it diminishes the value of the degree. Instead of an academic degree indicating hard work and an ability to learn, it simply indicates an ability to pay the tuition costs and show up to class. And so schools should address it in order to retain their reputation.
Saturday, February 21, 2009
Originalism and regime uncertainty
Originalism is the legal doctrine that the meaning of legal texts, especially the US constitution, is determined by the original meaning and intent of the document. It's a generally unpopular position nowadays. I prefer it because, more strictly adhered to, it would severely limit the size and scope of the federal government, which would have numerous benefits. But besides this ends-based reasoning, I think there are better theoretical justifications. For one, we might justify it on contractual grounds. Namely, the constitution was a contract between the federal government and the states, ratified over 200 years ago, and that to adhere to that contract is to go back to the meaning at the time of ratification. We can change that contract, but that requires both participation from the state and federal governments, which is done through the amendment process. To reinterpret the constitution at the federal level is to effectively change the contract without the states' permission.
Another more pragmatic, ends-based, justification that I've been thinking about recently is on the grounds of Regime Uncertainty. This is a concept from the work of Robert Higgs, that the uncertainty created by political action hampers economic development. The idea is simple: people are less likely to invest in the future when there is uncertainty. When legislators or regulators are empowered to make decisions that will have decisive impact on people's fortunes, it increases uncertainty. People will take less risk, for fear of being thwarted by the whim of politicians and regulators.
This also includes the whim of judges and justices. It doesn't just matter what laws are passed, but also how those laws are interpreted. When laws are vague, or clear rules have not yet been established, then companies will take a more conservative attitude, sometimes becoming excessively protective to avoid legal action. One can think of the all too obvious warning that one finds on food packaging: a nut container that says "this product may contain nuts" or a coffee lid that says, "contents may be hot." One is led to think, "Are we growing stupider that we need to be told these things." The answer is, no. It's just companies have grown excessively cautious to avoid litigation.
I can also think of the sexual harassment training that I went through in order to work at my school here. You'd think, by what they were telling us, that I could never speak to or even make eye contact with any of my co-workers without risking sexual harassment. It seems scary when you think of how easily you could potentially misstep, but the reality is that it is extremely unlikely for a sensible person who is considerate of others to be accused of sexual harassment. The people who design these courses are intentionally excessive--again, in order to avoid any risk of litigation. They don't know what ludicrous things someone might get offended at, and they want to avoid the legal fees, and they don't want to face an unpredictably judge or jury. The precedent on sexual harassment is unfortunately vague and rather generous to the victim, defining it as whatever the victim thinks is harassment. The concept of a "Rational Person" has been put in place to try to tame it. The idea here it is sexual harassment if a reasonable person would think it is sexual harassment. But in practice this just means that the judge or jury will determine whether they think it's sexual harassment, since most people will generally view themselves as a standard for a "rational person." This admittedly would exclude the most ludicrous sexual harassment suits, but it doesn't help too much in creating some certainty about what is prohibited and what forbidden.
Originalism has the advantage that one can actually know what the law is and says. One can know what a law means--what it limits, what it forbids, what it permits, and so on--with a high degree of certainty. If the law says, "interstate commerce" then you can say: "Interstate, that means between the states. And commerce means trade, perhaps also travel." Then, in light of the tenth amendment, you can say, "Thus, congress can't regulate intrastate commerce. Thus, the FDA can't regulate intrastate food and drug sale, the federal government can't prohibit medical marijuana that is entirely intrastate, the FCC can't regulate local radio station," and so on.
Admittedly, even adhering to a more originalist interpretation of the constitution, not all of it is completely transparent, but there is high level of confidence and a greater degree of certainty. And originalism will provide long term certainty. You know that the courts will not suddenly decide that certain forms of commerce are so important (or the judges dislike so strongly) that they can't possibly be intrastate.
This increased certainty will have economic benefits. It will adhere closer to rule of law, rather than rule of men.
Another more pragmatic, ends-based, justification that I've been thinking about recently is on the grounds of Regime Uncertainty. This is a concept from the work of Robert Higgs, that the uncertainty created by political action hampers economic development. The idea is simple: people are less likely to invest in the future when there is uncertainty. When legislators or regulators are empowered to make decisions that will have decisive impact on people's fortunes, it increases uncertainty. People will take less risk, for fear of being thwarted by the whim of politicians and regulators.
This also includes the whim of judges and justices. It doesn't just matter what laws are passed, but also how those laws are interpreted. When laws are vague, or clear rules have not yet been established, then companies will take a more conservative attitude, sometimes becoming excessively protective to avoid legal action. One can think of the all too obvious warning that one finds on food packaging: a nut container that says "this product may contain nuts" or a coffee lid that says, "contents may be hot." One is led to think, "Are we growing stupider that we need to be told these things." The answer is, no. It's just companies have grown excessively cautious to avoid litigation.
I can also think of the sexual harassment training that I went through in order to work at my school here. You'd think, by what they were telling us, that I could never speak to or even make eye contact with any of my co-workers without risking sexual harassment. It seems scary when you think of how easily you could potentially misstep, but the reality is that it is extremely unlikely for a sensible person who is considerate of others to be accused of sexual harassment. The people who design these courses are intentionally excessive--again, in order to avoid any risk of litigation. They don't know what ludicrous things someone might get offended at, and they want to avoid the legal fees, and they don't want to face an unpredictably judge or jury. The precedent on sexual harassment is unfortunately vague and rather generous to the victim, defining it as whatever the victim thinks is harassment. The concept of a "Rational Person" has been put in place to try to tame it. The idea here it is sexual harassment if a reasonable person would think it is sexual harassment. But in practice this just means that the judge or jury will determine whether they think it's sexual harassment, since most people will generally view themselves as a standard for a "rational person." This admittedly would exclude the most ludicrous sexual harassment suits, but it doesn't help too much in creating some certainty about what is prohibited and what forbidden.
Originalism has the advantage that one can actually know what the law is and says. One can know what a law means--what it limits, what it forbids, what it permits, and so on--with a high degree of certainty. If the law says, "interstate commerce" then you can say: "Interstate, that means between the states. And commerce means trade, perhaps also travel." Then, in light of the tenth amendment, you can say, "Thus, congress can't regulate intrastate commerce. Thus, the FDA can't regulate intrastate food and drug sale, the federal government can't prohibit medical marijuana that is entirely intrastate, the FCC can't regulate local radio station," and so on.
Admittedly, even adhering to a more originalist interpretation of the constitution, not all of it is completely transparent, but there is high level of confidence and a greater degree of certainty. And originalism will provide long term certainty. You know that the courts will not suddenly decide that certain forms of commerce are so important (or the judges dislike so strongly) that they can't possibly be intrastate.
This increased certainty will have economic benefits. It will adhere closer to rule of law, rather than rule of men.
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